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Edmund Husserl’s Constructive Phenomenology in the C-Manuscripts and 
other late research manuscripts 
 
“Das Absolute ist nichts anderes als absolute Zeitigung” 
(Edmund Husserl, Ms. C 1 5b, [Husserliana 15: 670]) 
 
Introduction 
Husserl’s so-called C-Manuscripts are important documents from many points of view. Husserl 
meant them to constitute a systematic work for publication under the working title (or one of 
its working titles) The Origin of Time. One particular reason for their especial importance is, in 
my view, the presence of four phenomenological methods at work in them: the static, the ge-
netic, the generative1 and the constructive2 (Eugen Fink, Alexander Schnell) methods. The first 
two were elaborated in detail in Husserl’s works, while clear outlines of the last two also 
emerged. Generative phenomenology aims at concrete historical life, and constructive phenom-
enology eventually transcends the limits of possible intuitive givenness and tries to answer the 
“highest and ultimate” metaphysical questions in a phenomenologically legitimate manner. 
Also of peculiar importance in the C-manuscripts is the internal relationship between the four 
methods within the text. 
This study aims to highlight Husserl’s notion of constructive phenomenology in the C-
Manuscripts and some other research manuscripts which he wrote in the same period. It is well 
known that, in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation (August-October 1932), Eugen Fink, Husserl’s 
assistant, wrote about “constructive phenomenology” in a detailed and systematic way. Husserl 
read it several times between August 1932 and January 1933, and he made extensive remarks 
and notes on his assistant’s writing. Yet Husserl received neither the idea, nor the term “phe-
nomenological construction” from his student. Both are found in his relatively early B II 2 
Manuscripts from the years 1907-1910 (partly published in Hua3 13 and 42). Fink influenced 
Husserl’s conception of constructive phenomenology, but he was no exclusive, not even a de-
cisive source for Husserl.  
                                                          
1 Cf. Anthony Steinbock: Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl, Northwestern University 
Press, 1995. 
2 Cf. Eugen Fink: Sixth Cartesian Meditation. Alexander Schnell: Husserl et les fondements de la phénoménologie 
constructive, Grenoble: Editions Jérôme Millon, 2007. 
3 Hua = Husserliana Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke. 
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Husserl applies constructive phenomenology on the level of the individual subject trying 
to thematize the problems of birth and death (Hua Mat4 8, texts e.g. 21, 43, 94, 96) as well as 
on the level of totality, of the Absolute, (Hua 15: text 38). (He also tackles the problem of God 
himself in detail in his late E-Manuscripts from the same period, the 1930s.) We shall take a 
closer look on the way Husserl unfolds apodictic implications in the given, in order to construct 
and reconstruct what lies beyond the limits of intuitively accessible. He tries to raise questions 
concerning individual immortality, the meaning of historicity and the existence of God from a 
transcendental point of view, which differs radically from the approaches of classical, specula-
tive metaphysics.  
This essay is aimed to highlight some peculiarities of Husserl’s notion of a phenomenolog-
ically founded metaphysics. It consists of three parts: 1) the context of C-Manuscripts, 2) meth-
odological layers in the C-Manuscripts and 3) constructive phenomenology in the C-Manu-
scripts and in other late materials. 
1. The Context of C-Manuscripts 
In 1928 Heidegger published Husserl’s work Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren 
Zeitbewußtseins (The Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness from the Year 1905),5 which 
was edited by Edith Stein. Its main texts derived from the 1904/05 winter semester lecture en-
titled Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Main Elements of the 
Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge), a work to which Husserl returned from time to 
time, reworked it in 1917 with the assistance of Edith Stein, and which gained its final form in 
1928. Struggling with the problem of time inspired and motivated Husserl to write in 1917/18 
the so-called Bernau Manuscripts, whose working-title was: Zeit und Individuation, eine Erneu-
erung einer rationalen Metaphysik nach den Principien (Time and Individuation: A Renovation 
of Rational Metaphysic based on Principles).6 After the publication of the main parts of his 
Time-lectures from 1904/05 in 1928, Husserl focused again on the problem of time. Heidegger 
himself also referred to the imminent publication of the Bernau Manuscripts in his Introduction 
to the Time-lectures.7 Husserl had a three-volume work in mind concerning the problem of 
time, whose first volume comprised the Time-lectures, the second was to contain the Bernau 
Manuscripts, and the third and last one the C-Manuscripts. Having asked Heidegger and Roman 
                                                          
4 Hua Mat = Husserliana Materialien.  
5 In the following: Time-lectures.  
6 Husserl’s letter to Heidegger, 28 March 1918. BW (= Briefwechsel) 4: 130. 
7 Heidegger 1928: 367. “Weiterführende, besonders seit 1917 wieder aufgenommene, mit dem Individuations-




Ingarden who both refused, in 1929 he asked Eugen Fink to bring the Bernau Manuscripts in 
the form of a systematic publication. Fink accepted the task, but never managed to carry it out.8 
Still, Husserl believed he could fully concentrate on elaborating the last and ultimate phases of 
his investigations concerning time, which were meant to be the C-Manuscripts (The Origin of 
Time). Husserl was dealing with this project from 1929 till the late summer (August) of 1934, 
when he started to write the Crisis-book.9 
In these years, alongside the problem of time Husserl dealt with many other questions and 
topics which cannot be separated from his late efforts at elaborating the phenomenology of 
time. In 1929 he wrote two major works, Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcenden-
tal Logic. In 1929, on a summer vacation in Tremezzo, Italy, he read through Heidegger’s works 
Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics carefully, and recognized 
Heidegger’s critical attitude towards his own understanding of phenomenology and philosophy 
in general. Between 1929 and 1934 Husserl devoted his efforts most importantly to three phil-
osophical projects: 1) the German edition of Cartesian Meditations,10 2) multiple attempts to 
write a several-volume systematic work on phenomenology,11 and 3) the C-Manuscripts. In 
close connection with these projects, the late B and E-Manuscripts from the end of 1929 and 
from the first half of the 1930s, many of which formed part of the first two projects, must also 
be considered. This is the context in which the C-Manuscripts are to be studied. 
The 1904/05 Time-lectures had a rather static view on time. In the 1917/18 Bernau Manu-
scripts, as Rudolf Bernet said, genetic phenomenology appears “in full force”.12 But in the Ber-
nau Manuscripts Husserl treated the formal and material aspect of a process as two, principally 
separable topics of the investigation. During the elaboration of genetic phenomenology in the 
1920s, Husserl came to the insight that the formal and material side of temporal events cannot 
really be separated.13 He utilized this consideration in the investigations of C-Manuscripts in a 
rich, careful and wide-ranging way: formal and material moments and aspects of processes are 
intimately intertwined in the descriptions of temporality in this work. Everything takes place in 
the context of universal temporality. Husserl’s late philosophy takes the form of a process-
                                                          
8 The Bernau Manuscripts were laid in Eugen Fink’s drawer till 1969, when he gave them to the Husserl Archive. 
9 Dieter Lohmar, “Einleitung des Herausgebers”, in Hua Mat 8: XIV.  
10 Hua 15: Divisions I and III (editorial division). 
11 Amongst others: Hua 15: Division II (editorial division). Cf.: Iso Kern, “Einleitung des Herausgebers”, in op. 
cit. XXXV-LXVII.  
12 Rudolf Bernet, “Husserl’s New Phenomenology of Time”, in Dieter Lohmar – Ichiro Yamaguchi (ed.), On Time 
– New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010: 16.  
13 See especially the texts of Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, (Hua 11). 
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philosophy – very much like the philosophy of Hegel, Bergson, and Whitehead. As he said in 
the C-Manuscripts: “The Absolute is nothing else than absolute temporalization” (Hua 15: 670).  
A very important feature of late E, B and C-Manuscripts (from the 1930s) is that construc-
tive phenomenology (the phenomenologically elaborated and grounded method to question be-
yond the limits of possible intuition in a legitimate way) reached a comprehensive and crystal-
lized form in these texts. The emergence of a systematic form of constructive phenomenology 
cannot be abstracted from Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, which originated from his contri-
bution to the German edition of Cartesian Meditations, written with Husserl as a mutual, com-
mon project, a demonstration of their collegial, scientific collaboration. Constructive phenom-
enology is a central part of Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation. It must be pointed out, however, 
that neither the idea of constructive phenomenology, nor the expression came from Fink; as 
stated in the Introduction, both are found in Husserl’s work long before the 1930s or even before 
he first met with Fink in 1927. The idea, and also the expression of phenomenological construc-
tion, goes back to the second half of the 1900s, around the years 1907/08. Fink influenced 
Husserl in this regard, but was in no way the only author of the entire theory of phenomenolog-
ical construction.  
2. Methodological Layers in the C-Manuscripts 
What makes the C-Manuscripts a unique set of works in Husserl’s career is his use of four 
different phenomenological methods in them, and efforts in the texts to connect these distinct 
methodological layers, the alternate forms of phenomenological analysis with one another, can 
clearly be identified. The four methods are: static, genetic, generative and constructive ways of 
investigation, each of which serving as a “leading clue” (“Leitfaden”) to the other, so to say, 
“higher” one.14 It means that the “lower” level yields topics, themes and phenomena to the 
“higher”: phenomena whose exact structure and background have to be disclosed and cleared 
up by those “higher-level” methods. The four methods together could reveal the phenomena in 
their fully concrete reality, and thus together fulfil the famous slogan and promise of phenom-
enological philosophy: “Back to the things themselves!” (Hua 19/1: 10).  
A key concern of phenomenology is the “principle of all principles”, according to which 
the only and exclusive source of legitimate cognition and knowledge is the “originally giving 
intuition” (Hua 3/1: 51, English <1983>: 44). However scientific, and thus epistemologically 
                                                          
14 See: Anthony Steinbock, “Generativity and the Scope of Generative Phenomenology”, in Donn Welton (ed.), 




legitimate (or even intelligible), a theory can only be called theory in case it has a possible 
intuitive basis or grounding. Husserl’s main goal with the elaboration of newer and newer 
methods was to radicalize this “principle of all principles”; it was to widen the borders of pos-
sible intuition, to push the boundaries of possible, scientifically articulated intuition farther. The 
aim of the perpetual radicalization of the phenomenological method was to explore the hidden 
depths of possible intuition, which could be thematised, conceptualized and described in a sci-
entifically rigorous manner.  
The field of static phenomenology is the terrain of already crystallized and stable forms of 
sense and experience. In static analysis we face fully formed objects. The genetic method, as it 
were, “brackets”15 the concept of object. The genetic investigation discloses everything in its 
radical temporality as a process or event; the genetic approach places everything within the 
context of becoming and genesis. From the early 1920s Husserl consistently made distinction 
between temporal and genetic analyses. The temporal analysis, the phenomenological descrip-
tion of time-consciousness, aims at the purely formal aspect of a process or an event, while the 
genetic treatment focuses on the material side of the same temporal course (cf. Hua 11: 128). 
One of the most important results of the C-Manuscripts is that it applies, in a consistent and 
systematic manner, the insight that the two aspects cannot be abstracted from each other, they 
are intertwined, intimately interpenetrating each other even within the context of time-con-
sciousness.   
With the elaboration of the genetic method, however, the capacities of phenomenological 
access to the “things themselves” were far from being entirely exhausted. The first signs of the 
“generative view” in Husserl’s thought appeared in the first half of the 1920s, by which he 
strove to place everything on the horizon of concrete historical life (cf. Hua 14: 223). The gen-
erative approach aimed to show the phenomena in an ever more concrete way; to demonstrate 
that every phenomenon is embedded into a concrete, historical, cultural, social and even bodily 
(collective bodily)16 process. Husserl gave a more systematic form to this methodological pro-
cedure in the 1930s (cf. texts of Husserliana 15, 29, 39 and 42). The name “generative” refers 
to the concrete historical, cultural life of generations, and to the process of “becoming” a “gen-
eration”.17 But generative phenomenology still remains within the borders of immanence, it still 
                                                          
15 Phrasing by Tamás Ullmann. Tamás Ullmann, A láthatatlan forma. Sematizmus és intencionalitás, (= The Invi-
sible Form. Schematism and Intentionality), Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2010. In Hungarian. 
16 Cf. Hua 39: 181 (1932). “Das Wir hat seine kollektive Leiblichkeit”. 
17 Cf. Steinbock, 1995: 3. 
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does not reach the ultimate forms of transcendence, the realm of “’supreme and ultimate’ ques-
tions” (Hua 1: 182, English <1960>: 156); in the end, to questions related to the final ethical 
problems and values, to the fate of soul before birth and after death, and to the essence and 
existence of God. This was the task of constructive phenomenology, whose most important 
function was to question beyond the limits of possible intuition as such, in a phenomenologi-
cally legitimate (because phenomenologically-apodictically motivated) manner. This method 
reached its most matured manifestation and articulation in the manuscripts of the 1930s, and 
especially in the C-Manuscripts. 
In the C-Manuscripts, as mentioned above, all four methods − the static,18 the genetic,19 
the generative20 and the constructive21 − are present in a systematically interrelated and con-
nected way, as the higher is built upon the lower, and the problem-fields of their scope partly 
overlap. There is a close, internal and, from a certain point of view, continuous connection 
between them. The C-Manuscripts could be considered a systematic, coherent work, whose 
highest aim was to construct in a phenomenological manner the most concrete, ultimate phe-
nomenon: the Absolute itself, as a process; within which every other phenomenon and entity is 
a dependent, and in the last analysis, abstract moment. The ultimately concrete phenomenon, 
according to Husserl, is the Absolute. 
Comparing the Bernau Manuscripts and the C-Manuscripts in regard to their treatment of 
time-consciousness, perhaps the most significant characteristic of the latter, in contrast with the 
former, is the systematic and coherent effort to connect the subjective and intersubjective level 
of time-consciousness with each other; to weave together the strings of primordial and inter-
subjective genesis as closely and strongly as possible. The lower levels of constitution turn out 
to be dependent moments of the higher; on an appropriately high level of constitutive analysis 
it could be clearly seen that the constitution of time and time-consciousness are embedded in a 
cultural, historical and bodily (collective bodily) context. Subjective and primordial constitu-
tion is only an abstraction.  
3. Constructive Phenomenology in the C-Manuscripts and in other late materials 
As mentioned before, Husserl did not invent constructive phenomenology in the C-Manuscripts 
or in the period of C-Manuscripts; neither was it the result of Fink’s influence. Husserl evolved 
                                                          
18 Hua Mat 8: 5, 154, 170f, 259, 335, 420.  
19 Op. cit. 37, 131, 170f, 210, 241f, 274, 279, 352, 394, 420, 435. 
20 Op. cit. 155f, 166f, 177, 214, 217, 241, 275, 369ff, 391-394, 406, 427, 436ff, 443-446. 
21 Op. cit. 12, 19, 86, 158, 186, 211, 217 [footnote], 218, 222ff, 226f, 257 [footnote], 261, 263, 279, 326, 328f, 




this method long before the 1930s; as early as the second half of the 1900s. However, the 
method reached its most coherent and matured state in the C-Manuscripts and other manuscripts 
from that time, such as late B and E-Manuscripts. The essential point of constructive phenom-
enology or phenomenological construction is to unfold the principally invisible in a phenome-
nologically legitimate way, which cannot be brought to an intuitive givenness for theoretical 
reasons. At a certain point we reach the boundaries of possible intuitive givenness, but we can 
discover a set of apodictical implications,22 which motivate us in an apodictic way to perform 
phenomenological constructions, and thus thematize phenomena which cannot be presented in 
an intuitively completed or filled manner. 
Phenomenological construction (or constructive phenomenology) has many different fields 
and topics of application in Husserl’s work, of which the four main types are: 1) constructions 
within the context of the eidetic method aimed at the ultimate pure possibilities of appearance,23 
2) constructions aimed to disclose the deepest, irreflexive layers of subjectivity, which latter 
include primal passivity; 3) constructions directed at the ultimate metaphysical facts, which 
Husserl also calls primal or primordial facts (Urfakta, Urtatsache); and 4) constructions con-
cerning the phenomenological Absolute (problems of historical teleology, God, immortality [or 
mortality] of the soul, freedom of will and the highest ethical norms and values). These phe-
nomena either avoid the sphere of possible intuition (as structures and phenomena of primordial 
layer of subjectivity, of primal passivity, and the phenomenological Absolute), or articulate the 
most general conditions and structures of every possible manifestation (as eidetic constructions 
and primal metaphysical facts). Three topics out of the four appeared in a relatively early stage 
of Husserl’s development: 1) constructions concerning the Absolute, in the lectures and re-
search manuscripts of the period 1907-1910 (Hua 28, Ms. B II 2 [Hua 13, 42], Ms. B I 4 [un-
published]), and also Ideas… I (1912) (Hua 3/1: 175 [footnote]),24 2) constructions of pure 
possibilities related to the eidetic method (op. cit. 147, 153), 3) primal or primordial metaphys-
ical facts (op. cit. 98).25 The last main domain of construction, aimed at the deepest layer of 
subjectivity and primal passivity, is the only one which appeared in a well-elaborated, matured 
                                                          
22 “Apodiktische Implikation”, Hua 42: 570, cf. also Fink 1988.  
23 E.g. Hua 41: 206, 286, 318, 321, 322, 351, 359.  
24 Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, first book: general introduc-
tion to a pure phenomenology. Hua 3/1. Here furthermore referred briefly as: Ideas. 
Loc. cit. “We do not extend the controversy here to the domain of theology. The idea of God is a necessary limiting 
concept in epistemological considerations, and an indispensable index to the construction of certain limiting con-
cepts which not even the philosophizing atheist can do without” (English [1983]: 187 [footnote]).  
25 Loc. cit. “Obviously that does not imply that the necessity of the being of this or that present mental process is 
a pure essential necessity, that is: a purely eidetic particularity subsumed under an eidetic law; it is the necessity 
of a fact, and is called so because an eidetic law is involved in the fact and indeed, in this case, involved in the 
existence of the fact as fact” (English [1983]: 103).  
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form in his late period, most importantly in the C-Manuscripts. In fact, one more important goal 
of this late work was to systematically “excavate”26 these layers and structures constituting 
subjectivity. 
The main topic of phenomenological constructions in the C-Manuscripts is the construc-
tive-reconstructive disclosing of primal passivity and the structures of the deepest layers of 
subjectivity (primal hyle, primal ego [Ur-Ich, Urich, Urmonade], primal kinaesthesia, transcen-
dental instincts). According to Husserl’s standpoint in his late work, there are layers and struc-
tures of subjectivity which cannot be made visible by any other earlier phenomenological 
method in a legitimate way. They are prereflexive and irreflexive, they precede and avoid the 
scope of phenomenological reflexion. They could be thematised only in an indirect way; they 
could only be seen, as it were, “from the corner of our eyes”. The phenomenological construc-
tion aims exactly at this indirect thematisation of prereflexive and irreflexive structures and 
moments of consciousness. The indirect thematisation is accompanied by a sort of indirect ap-
odicticity. This kind of phenomenological construction unfolds the play of primal ego and pri-
mal hyle in the deep layer of subjectivity. In Husserl’s descriptions, the primal ego turns to-
wards the primal hyle with an instinctive movement of primal kinaesthesia (Hua Mat 8: 225). 
According to him, the primal, deepest layer prereflexive of time-consciousness is constituted in 
this instinctive, kinaesthetic movement of the primal ego.27 The sphere of primal hyle, its primal 
affective influences the primal ego, and the primal ego’s instinctive (primal instinctive 
[urinstinktive])28 movements and actions in primal kinaesthetic processes, which directed at 
this primal hyle, altogether make up the realm of primal passivity. The primal ego is not the 
pre-ego (Vor-Ich), which latter is the centre and agent of transcendental instincts; the primal 
ego is the ultimately constituting, entirely concrete transcendental agent, which precedes and 
avoids every reflection. It is the “speculative thought” of Husserl’s late works.29 The terrain of 
primal passivity alongside with the primal ego is a speculative achievement of the C-Manu-
scripts in a phenomenologically appropriate manner. 
In his late period Husserl connected the above-mentioned four types of phenomenological 
constructions in a systematic, coherent, consequent and rational manner, so that outlines of a 
                                                          
26 Husserl even uses the term “archaeology” in this context. Hua Mat 8: 23, 356f. Cf. also: Nam-In Lee, Edmund 
Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte, Dordrecht: Springer, 1993: 5, 77f, 80.  
27 Cf. also: Inga Römer, Das Zeitdenken bei Husserl, Heidegger und Ricœur, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010: 88f, 95ff.  
28 “Instinct” in the context of Husserl’s late transcendental phenomenology means a purely passive teleological 
striving or trend of transcendental subjectivity. Cf. also: Lee, 1993.  
29 Phrasing by Gábor Toronyai. Tudományos életfilozófia. Tanulmány Edmund Husserl késői gondolkodásáról 




well-articulated, structured philosophy of process emerged. At its core, as László Tengelyi cor-
rectly observed30, is his metaphysics of facticity, the metaphysics of primal or primordial facts. 
This metaphysics articulates and organizes every other moments and considerations of his phi-
losophy in the 1930s. The most important and the highest amongst these original, primal facts 
is the fact of Absolute. Its givenness, openness, dynamic contextuality, its processual, self-tem-
poralizing and self-unfolding nature, are its most essential characteristics. The ultimate fact is 
that of the Absolute’s, which precedes and at the same time comprises every other fact and 
eidos (Hua 15: 385f).31  
The Absolute is, in the end, God her/himself, that is to say, the most dominant feature of 
the Absolute is its (processually understood and interpreted) divine nature; God, who penetrates 
everything and who is immanent to everything (op. cit. 381, 385). In Husserl’s view God is the 
ultimate context of every being and knowledge, who embraces every finite and particular entity, 
phenomenon, knowledge, and view-point. As a dynamic, processual super-context s/he incor-
porates all lower forms and levels of the phenomenological absolute, such as universal tran-
scendental intersubjectivity and all the primal egos, as her/his dependent moments.32 S/he – as 
the ultimate foundation of being (ibid.)  – also comprises every ultimate conditions of all pos-
sible appearances and entities; the conditions for factual as well as essential (eidetic) entities. 
Every primal ego with its (her/his) primal passivity belongs to this Absolute in an immanent 
way; the transcendental instincts of these egos connect them into an instinctive community, and 
through those instincts they are integrated into the historical, open life of the Absolute (op. cit. 
593-604). The transcendental instincts direct the primal egos and their intersubjective commu-
nity towards the Absolute (towards the ultimate, divine layer of the Absolute). 
In the 1930s (in the late E-Manuscripts), and also in the second half of the 1900s (Ms. B II 
2, B I 4, Hua 28), God is the infinite aspect of subjectivity, a super-subject, who is inherent and 
immanent to every particular and finite subject, as well as to the universal, infinitely open tran-
scendental intersubjectivity. S/he unites in her/himself every opposite, contradictory features 
and attributes in a dialectical way; s/he is personal and super-personal (non-personal) at the 
same time. In Husserl’s interpretation, the phenomenological analysis unfolds several direct 
                                                          
30 László Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik, Freiburg/München: 
Karl Alber Verlag, 2014: 180-227.   
31 Cf. also: Rudolf Bernet—Iso Kern—Eduard Marbach, Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens, Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 2016: 212f.  
32 To this see: Lee Chun Lo, Die Gottesauffassung in Husserls Phänomenologie, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 
Verlag, 2008. 
In Husserl there are three basic layers of the Absolute: 1) the primal ego and her/his absolute consciousness, 2) the 
transcendental intersubjectivity and 3) God as the divine aspect of the totality of Being. The third one (God) inte-
grates in Her/Himself the lower levels. 
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and indirect ways to the divine region of transcendental subjectivity or to God; most of them 
are related to the phenomenon of teleology, particularly universal teleology.33 In Husserl’s opin-
ion we have an immediate, intimate experience of God, of the divine dimension of subjectivity; 
but we can thematize and conceptualize God in a phenomenologically legitimate way only in-
directly, only through the method of phenomenological construction; and fundamentally 
through the phenomenological investigation of teleological structures of the self-constitution of 
subjectivity (and intersubjectivity) and the constitution of the world. According to him, God 
gains her/his full concretion, her/his fully concrete access to the world, through the particular, 
finite subjects; through residing in their particular, concrete point of view concerning them-
selves and the world.34 Apart from concrete transcendental intersubjectivity God cannot be con-
crete either.  
In Husserl’s opinion, in transcendental reflection every monad, every transcendental sub-
ject represents a fixed, yet in a temporal sense dynamic (as it dynamically processualizes itself) 
point of view in the system of the Absolute. In this regard Husserl describes the transcendental 
egos, the monads, as transcendental substances (Hua Mat 8: 176f). These substances make up 
the concrete, historical life of the Absolute; they are the concrete and dynamic points of view 
which the Absolute has concerning his/her different parts, moments, entities and events. In this 
metaphysical context Husserl even admits the possibility of “metempsychosis” (“Seelenwan-
derung”): in his account, the transcendental monads continuously activate and inactivate them-
selves; they fell into asleep (death, in the interpretation of the late Husserl, is just a deeper form 
of sleeping, from which we perpetually awake), and awake on a higher level of transcendental 
development (ibid.).35 
                                                          
33 Angela Ales Bello spoke of “five ways to God” in Husserl – making a parallelism between Saint Thomas of 
Aquinas (his “five ways to God”) and Husserl. (Angela Ales Bello, The Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations, 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2009). The five ways in Husserl’s philosophy according to Bello are: 1) the objective: the 
way of teleologies which are constituted in the world (op. cit. 25ff), 2) the subjective: the mirroring or reflection 
of God (and the teleologies created by Her/Him) as transcendent pole in the transcendental ego (op. cit. 28ff), 3) 
the intersubjective way: the question of empathy and the notion of a divine monad (a super-monad), of the Highest 
Monad, and the question of empathical connection with this divine monad (op. cit. 33ff), 4) the hyletic way: the 
instinctive directedness which inherent to the instinctive constitution of the sensuous hlye, and which – in the end 
– is directed towards God Her/Himself (op. cit. 46ff), and last, but not least: 5) the ethical way, which shows God 
as an ethical ideal and as the ultimate metaphysical support of freedom (54ff). 
In this context the work of Balázs Mezei is also very important: Zárójelbe tett Isten. Edmund Husserl és egy 
fenomenológiai proto-teológia vázlata, (God in Brackets. Edmund Husserl and the Sketch of a Phenomenological 
Proto-teology), Budapest: Osiris, 1997. In Hungarian. 
34 Cf. Lo, 2008: 168-173.  
35 Loc. cit. “Die Monaden sind transzendentale Substanzen, bezogen auf ihre transzendentale Zustandszeitlichkeit, 
auf ihr Leben. Aber nur das spezifische Leben, das sich verweltlichte, enthält personale Einheiten als sich entwi-
ckelnde aus Passivität oder aus Aktivität, aus Unfreiheit oder Freiheit – wenn nicht jede Monade vielerlei Spezies-
leben hat, wobei noch der leibnizsche Gedanke einer transzendentalen „Entwicklung“ in der „Seelenwanderung“ 
zu bedenken wäre.” 
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In an indirect way, constructive phenomenology could treat even the highest and ultimate 
metaphysical questions. But the whole picture is far more complicated. There are no fully dis-
closed, entirely answered questions; there are no answers with ultimate, absolute interpreta-
tions. Every answer, every philosophical, scientific theory and thought is embedded in infinitely 
open and always moving horizons of sense. The sense of the answers and of the theories we 
elaborate and prove, is always unfinished and open. The ever newer and perpetually enriching 
context which is unfolded by the philosophical and scientific researches sheds ever newer light 
on the sense of philosophical and scientific thoughts and theses. Philosophical and scientific 
research, as Husserl always stated and emphasized, is a never ending story, an infinite approach 
to the ultimate truth, which is an ideal that cannot actually be reached.  
The phenomenology as constructive phenomenology is capable of productive and fruitful 
communication with positive, normal sciences too; of unfolding the deeper phenomenological 
and metaphysical meaning of the latest, most recent scientific findings and discoveries, and 
integrating them into its always moving and infinitely open, processual system. It is perhaps 
the highest insight of phenomenology (of Husserl and phenomenology in general) that there is 
no ultimate context, except for the context of Absolute itself. This absolute context cannot en-
tirely be disclosed or exhausted; it could only be revealed and described indirectly, always in a 
partial, finite and incomplete way.  
Conclusion 
This essay had two main goals: on one hand, we tried to demonstrate the systematic connection 
of the four fundamental methodological approach of Husserl’s phenomenology in the C-Man-
uscripts; on the other hand, we attempted to show some basic peculiarities of Husserl’s con-
structive phenomenology, which was the ultimate result of his efforts to radicalize the phenom-
enological philosophy. The final aim of constructive phenomenology was to make accessible 
to phenomenology such phenomena and topics, which – for theoretical reasons – lie beyond the 
limits of possible intuitive givenness. The C-Manuscripts document the systematic connected-
ness of the four phenomenological apparatus; in them, the constructive phenomenology, which 
emerged in Husserl’s work around the years 1907-1910 at the latest, reached its most mature, 
most elaborate form. 
We tried to show that phenomenological constructions radicalized and renewed phenome-
nology in a way that it could reach and thematize problems which earlier lied beyond its range; 
namely, problems of classical metaphysics and intuitively inaccessible, though otherwise 
proved and confirmed, findings of natural sciences. Husserl’s constructive phenomenology is 
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capable to create a fruitful communication also between these remarkably different fields of 
human culture, metaphysics and positive sciences; and at the same time to avoid the failure that 
László Tengelyi called “naturalist autarcism”, a sort of naïve naturalist positivism.36 Construc-
tive phenomenology is able to integrate and utilize both in a philosophically legitimate and 
productive way. 
This philosophical method demonstrates that every knowledge and being is embedded in a 
wider context, and the different contexts are connected together in an organic way, in the form 
of an always widening universal network. It unfolds ever newer contexts, without turning to 
sceptical relativism. Contexts and contextualization have their own essential laws and connec-
tions with absolute validity. The ultimate context is that of the Absolute, which is accessible 
only in a partial and indirect way for our philosophical and scientific researches; but we see this 
context of the Absolute always in a more and more exact and richer way in the infinitely open 
history of philosophy and science. 
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